

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07

IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /089 W

-----261843Z 059744 /62

R 261715Z MAY 77

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2162

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0265

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: MAY 26 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE 137TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS  
ON MAY 26, CHAIRED BY CZECHOSLOVAK REP (MEISNER), FRG  
REP (REHRENDTS DELIVERED THE ONLY STATEMENT. IN IT,  
BEHRENDTS STRESSED THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS  
WAS THE CENTRAL ISSUE WHICH PARTICIPANTS MUST ADDRESS  
AND THAT THIS OUTCOME MUST BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF  
PARITY IF IT IS TO ENHANCE STABILITY. BEHRENDTS ALSO RE-  
JECTED EASTERN CLAIMS THAT APPROXIMATE PARITY IN MILITARY  
MANPOWER ALREADY EXISTS AND COUNTERED EASTERN CHARGES  
THAT THE WEST WAS BUILDING UP ITS ARMED FORCES. THE  
MAIN POINTS OF THE FRG STATEMENT, THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH  
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FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM, WERE:

1. THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS THE CENTRAL  
ISSUE WHICH PARTICIPANTS MUST ADDRESS SINCE IT WILL  
CREATE THE ENDURING FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY IN CENTRAL  
EUROPE.

2. THIS OUTCOME CAN ONLY LEAD TO STRENGTHENED PEACE AND SECURITY IF IT CONFERS NO MILITARY ADVANTAGES ON ANY PARTY.

3. SINCE AN OUTCOME WHICH WOULD PERPETUATE THE MILITARY SUPERIORITY OF ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER WOULD DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE DISADVANTAGED SIDE, ONLY AN OUTCOME BASED ON PARITY WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH INCREASED STABILITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

4. PARITY, WHICH HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN OTHER DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, SHOULD ALSO BE ADOPTED AS THE BASIC PRINCIPLE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, HOWEVER, DOES NOT UNREALISTICALLY SEEK TO ESTABLISH PARITY IN ALL FORCE ELEMENTS.

6. THE WEST HAS PREVIOUSLY EXPLAINED IN DETAIL WHY ITS POSITION CENTERS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF GROUND FORCES.

7. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING IS SOUND AND PRACTICABLE SINCE THE SOLDIER IS THE BASIC MEASURE OF MILITARY CAPABILITY AND PRESENTS NO PROBLEM IN ESTABLISHING EQUIVALENCE.

8. THE COMMON CEILING MUST BE COLLECTIVE IN NATURE IN ORDER TO AVOID INTERFERENCE WITH NATO'S INTEGRATED CONFIDENTIAL

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DEFENSE STRUCTURE OR PREJUDICE TO THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE.

9. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY WOULD REDUCE THE EASTGDS MASSIVE, DESTABILIZING SUPERIORITY IN TANKS -- A SUPERIORITY WHOSE IMPACT IS INTENSIFIED BY THE FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY.

10. THE WEST AUGMENTEDWTS ORIGINAL POSITION BY PROPOSING IN DECEMBER 1975 TO REDUCE AND LIMIT US NUCLEAR POTENTIAL WITHOUT ASKING FOR ANY ADDITIONAL EASTERN REDUCTIONS IN EXCHANGE.

11. MEANWHILE, THE EAST STILL PROPAGATES FROM

THE OUTSET, AN OUTCOME WHICH WOULD CONTRACTUALIZE EXISTING EASTERN MILITARY SUPERIORITY THE DETRIMENT OF STABILITY AND WESTERN SECURITY.

12. INSTEAD OF CHANGING ITS PROPOSED OUTCOME, THE EAST PREFERS TO CLAIM THAT APPROXIMATE PARITY ALREADY EXISTS ALTHOUGH THIS ASSERTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS.

13. DESPITE CURRENT EASTERN CLAIMS OF THE EXISTENCE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT WESTERN FIGURES TO THE CONTRARY ARE ACCURATE AND THAT THE TWO SIDES ARE USING DIFFERENT COUNTING CRITERIA.

14. EASTERN ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS PRIOR TO THE TABLING OF ITS DATA BY THE EAST CORROBORATE THE WESTERN ASSESSMENT THAT THERE IS A SIZEABLE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER FAVORING THE EAST IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

NOTE BY OC/T: #AS RECEIVED.  
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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

15. THE EAST ALSO HAS SUBSTANTIAL NUMERICAL SUPERIORITIES IN TANKS, AIRCRAFT, ARTILLERY PIECES AND MANY OTHER MAJOR ARMAMENTS; SUPERIORITIES WHICH IN MANY CASES HAVE BEEN GROWING CONTINUOUSLY.

16. RECENT EASTERN STATEMENTS ACCUSING NATO OF BUILDING UP ITS ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ARE MISLEADING AND IGNORE THE EAST'S OWN FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS.

17. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS CONSIDER IT USEFUL THAT EASTERN POLITICAL LEADERS NO LONGER PUBLICLY CLAIM THE NECESSITY OF AND THE RIGHT TO MILITARY SUPERIORITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

18. REAL PARITY, NOT A FICTITIOUS PARITY AMOUNTING TO DE FACTO ACCEPTANCE OF EXISTING DISPARITIES FAVOURING THE CONFIDENTIAL

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EAST, MUST BE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED AS THE GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

19. TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS, THE EAST SHOULD NOT ONLY CHANGE ITS ARGUMENTATION BUT ITS PROPOSALS, THEMSELVES, SO THAT THEY CONFORM TO THE OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES AS THE OUTCOME OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS. RESOR

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